Why did the 8888 Generation Falls into the Army’s Trap?
Kanbawza
Win
An open letter written in Burmese by little Ma Hla Myaing
to the 8888 generation leaders of Burma seems to hit the nail on the head.[1]
The Tatmadaw (Burmese Army) visualise that the 8888 generations is the upcoming
force to reckon, because it is a movement and not a political party. The
Tatmadaw visualise that NLD is nothing without Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and is
incapable of producing young and vibrant leaders and unlike the 8888 generation
who can not only organize but also works hands in glove with the Burmese
Diaspora communities is more of a threat.. It also sensed that NLD cannot keep
its house in order.[2] The master brains of the Tatmadaw cleverly crafted the
policy of “Let the minority fight the minority” pitting national sovereignty
versus humanitarian and human rights, just to discredit the Lady, on her trip to
Europe and shore up the army’s image. But instead it finds itself on hot
pebbles, compelling them to let Turkey Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu tour
Arakan State, that compelled Burmese government to accept an independent
enquiry commission from OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation of
56 Islamic states promoting Muslim solidarity in economic, social, and political
affairs) and being targeted by Islamic extremists organizations of the world. In
Burmese we say (,Hkaxmifa=umif rd) instead of trapping a rabbit, the house cat
was caught. What a shame for the country and the government which paints the
picture that it is unable to settle its own domestic problem is being forced to
accept international arbitration.
Clearly the continuing
conflict in Burma is not simply fought in terms of restoring democracy and human
rights. It must be emphasized that there is a deeper politics of historical
memories, which continues to serve as one of the biggest obstacles to national
reconciliation. Historians know well that every story has many sides, many
aspects, and many dimensions to explore. When a story is about such a topic as
faith or politics, emotions can quickly become charged.[3] Politics and
contemporary history often intertwine, and inextricably connect, as individuals
advocate for beliefs and ideas important to them. When history and beliefs are
challenged, it is easy to believe we ourselves are being challenged. Unchecked,
this can open old wounds, and further the distance between us.[4]
Each community feels a need to retain its sense of self, its collective
memory in the face of the Myanmar-centered vision of the Burmese nation by the
government, which the ethnic nationalities have come to view as colonial power.
The government's version of Burma's history is radically different from what
their own communal and ethnic memories teach them. Should any one group operate
with racial or ethnic superiority - as Myanmar Buddhists have often done - it is
certain to trigger deep resentment and forceful, dysfunctional expression of
ethno-nationalisms of the most intense category? The value of memories, like
anything that is human and socially constructed, has its limits. When two
competing memories collide, as it were, the reliance on memories sets back the
clock of history (of a nation) today one of independence, where the primordial
sentiments surge. It is no longer fruitful to use the past events or memories
as a guide.
Unfortunately, it is inconceivable that these
differences in memories can be sorted out in any mutually satisfactory way,
given the sorry state of hardened ethnic distrust and irreconcilable versions of
these memories among different ethnic communities each of who views Burma as
their ancestral home. For instance, the military leaders and the great majority
of the Mahar Myanmar share a belief that the present day Burma developed in a
linear fashion straight from the founding of the first Burmese kingdom at the
central plains of Pagan in the 11th century. Only the British colonization of
the Myanmar Kingdom disrupted this historical development. They believe in the
accounts of their mighty, expansionistic imperialist empires with subordinate
alliances made up of multi-ethnic and multi-language communities, including the
Shan, the Arakanese, the Mons, and so on, encompassing the present day Burma and
its political boundaries and, at times, stretching into neighbouring India and
Thailand are their subordinates and hence should not be treated as equal. How to
get rid of this erroneous disease is a major problem.[5]
A
wildly different version is in circulation among non-Myanmar ethnic groups. In
his report on State Constitutions Drafting Process, General Secretary Lian H.
Sakhong of the United Nationalities League for Democracy writes:
"The
Union of Burma is a nation-state of diverse ethnic nations (ethnic nationalities
or nationalities), founded in 1947 at the Panglong Conference by pre-colonial
independent ethnic nationalities such as the Chin, the Kachin, Karen, Karenni,
Mon and Rakhine (Arakan), Myanmar (Burman) and Shan based on the principle of
equality. As it was founded by formerly independent peoples in 1947 through an
agreement, the boundaries of the Union of Burma today are not
historical."
This is a representative view among many non-Myanmar
ethnic groups in Burma. These divergent - and obviously irreconcilable -
memories die hard, and there is no way a common threat out of these divergent
histories can be drawn. Despite the polemics of federalism, some of the ethnic
groups such as the Shan appear to have kept their independence aspirations.
The Myanmar military leadership is fully aware of these
centrifugal tendencies backed up by corresponding or supporting historical
memories of various ethnic communities. How should Burma proceed if its
histories are tortured and unhelpful?
If her past is no guide - and then
perhaps her future - more accurately, how the parties want Burma's future to be
- the vision for a future Burma - can serve as a blueprint. Such a vision born
out of civic, national debate is solely needed, and so are the leaders who are
equipped intellectually to appreciate this process and not allow them to succumb
to powerful primordial sentiments in the process. No doubt the flames of
ethno-nationalisms of Burma will continue to burn, given the fact that many
non-Myanmar ethnic communities have felt that they have been deprived of
equality, politically, culturally and economically under the Myanmar dominated
rule for so long. The distrust and fear of the Myanmar commonly shared by
non-Myanmar groups throughout the country began long before the nationalist army
headed by Aung San came into existence in 1941.
Tatmadaw
have become a state within the State with its own short- and long-term plans
designed to ensure the institutional survival, dominance, and reproduction in
the country, and this is the structural issue that can help explain the
longevity of the Tatmadaw as the dominant political force. The NLD may be the
most popular brand name and symbol of democratic change or the push for it, but
it is the Tatmadaw which the majority of people have come to view as the
institution which can repel any threats, external and internal, to the country's
territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence as was demonstrated in the
Mujahid crisis in Western Burma’s sectarian crisis.
Throughout Burma's society, not excluding the Myanmar majority communities,
there is widely shared a great deal of animosity and hatred toward the Tatmadaw
and the military officers at all levels, not just the top brass. However, most
Burmese have a sense of Myanmar-centered nationalism and feel some ideological
affinity with their military rulers, more than our cosmopolitan, "enlightened"
Myanmar politicians who speak a language littered with words like "federalism"
or "self-determination."
Suffice it to say no Myanmar
politician, however popular, has articulated where he or she really stands on
the question of ethnic nationalities right to self-determination, including the
right to secede from the Union of Burma. They all take the majority position
that under no circumstances is secession of any group acceptable. For no matter
how much animosity between the people - especially the Myanmar or those who have
bought into this Myanmar-centered nationalism or worldview - and the Tatmadaw
personnel, they all drink from the same ideological well-spring. This shared
ideological bond serves as an unbroken structural linkage between the Tatmadaw
and the majority Myanmar. It is a bond based on ethno-nationalistic emotions
that give the great majority of people a strong sense of belonging to a national
community in which they are dominant. It is a much more powerful bond than that
which may have developed among NLD supporters subscribing to a set of liberal
political values and beliefs with no root in the native political culture. As
far as the Myanmar majority, their blood is still thicker than the water of
friendship. While the democratic Myanmar wishes to befriend and adopt liberal
values and outlook, when push comes to shove, they will go with their blood ties
at the expense of equality and ethnic justice. This is where the 8888 Generation
falls. The country’s structural bond of ethno-nationalism plays out even among
relatively sophisticated dissidents in exile during discussions, on-line or
otherwise, that touch on ethnic equality, self-determination and
re-constructing alternative histories of Burma and the ethnic communities. When
juxtaposed with the ideological discourse of human rights and democracy, it is
elevated as the mainstream ideology among the NLD-led democracy movement.
Likewise, Thai-Burma and Indo-Burmese border-based dissident
organizations and armed resistance groups always encounter occasions, formal and
otherwise, in which the position taken by Myanmar dissidents resembles that of
their ideological kinfolks - the members of the military government and its
official view toward ethnic relations in the country. Indeed, in the
half-century since independence, the Myanmar and the non Myanmar are still mired
in what Clifford Geertz terms " the pattern of primordial dissidence."
If the Burmese authorities continue to teach the Myanmar version of
history in the Burma proper area as it is their right in as much as the ethnic
nationalities continue to teach their version of history in the their own
respective States and divisions and not to the whole country, it will slowly
erode the Pyidoungsu spirit. In the ethnic dominated states their version of
history will have to be taught as the ethnic nationalities cannot impose their
version of history to the Myanmar group vice versa in as much as the Myanmar
cannot impose their version on the ethnic nationalities. For history is the
study of the past of the whole country the History of the Union of Burma or
rather Pyidaungsu History(jynfaxmifpkordkif;) which started with the Panglong
Accord should be taught. Then it must be imposed on the education of the whole
country. This is just but one way of solving the historical memories and well as
tantamount to solidifying the Union Spirit or Pyidoungsu Seikdat
(jynfaxmifpkpdwf "gwf) and that the Myanmar and the non Myanmar are
equals.
No doubt Burma’s human rights situation has improved
notably in some respects but it has significantly worsened in Kachin and Arakan
states. Freedoms of assembly and expression remain restricted, and hundreds of
political prisoners and many prisoners of conscience remain in jail. In several
ethnic minority areas, the army continues to commit violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law against civilians, including acts that may
constitute crimes against humanity or war crimes, Amnesty International said in
a statement submitted to the UN Human Rights Council.
“Many of
these reported crimes are taking place despite cease-fire agreements between
the Myanmar army and the relevant ethnic minority armed groups, the cease-fire
is not being obeyed, while in others serious human rights violations
continue even when the fighting has stopped.”[6]
It also cited “credible
accounts” of the army using prison convicts as porters, forcing them to act as
human shields and minesweepers. Latest report indicates that in exterminating
the Kachin the Tatmadaw has deployed over 100 battalions of troops and t least
55,000 people have been internally displaced since fighting resumed in mid-2011.
Extrajudicial executions, children killed by shelling and other indiscriminate
attacks, forced labour, and unlawful confiscation of food and property are the
usual standard of the Burmese army.[7] The Investigation and prosecution of
human rights violations and crimes against humanity are obstructed by Article
445 of the 2008 Constitution, which stipulates that “no proceeding” may be
instituted against officials of the military governments since 1988 “in respect
of any act done in the execution of their respective duties.”
In an early February statement, Ojea Quintana stressed that moving forward on
Burma cannot ignore or whitewash what happened in the past, and that
acknowledging the violations suffered will be necessary to ensure national
reconciliation and prevent future violations from occurring. It seems that the
Thein Sein administration, like the previous Junta will continue to uphold,
“Lying the very concept of truth.” and so the international community and the
world at large must improve its understanding of the aspirations of Burma’s
ethnic nationalities and give greater attention to addressing the needs of these
ethnic nationalities in discussions of the country’s human rights situation
before indulging in trade and development works..
[1] I label her as little because I saw
her picture flashed on the media when she just was a little girl that
participated alongside with her elder brother Tin Maung OO who was first student
to be hanged by the Burmese army way back in 70s, now a responsible person
looking after her parents and the rest of the family in Canada is carrying on
the fight.
[2] I learned that my Article “Killing two Birds with a
Stone, a Win Win Situation” ideas an attempt of solving the Rohingya and Chinese
crisis which was emailed to the lady never reaches her. On following up I
lamentably discovered that even the major broadcasting stations of the world had
to bribe her associates in order interview her. Very lately she herself has to
discharged some of her handpicked followers The moral corruption initiated by Ne
Win administrations runs deep
[3]May Oo, Naw; “Reconciliation needed for a
United Burma” Irrawaddy Magazine 16th March 2010
[4] May Oo, Naw; “Reconciliation needed for a United Burma” Irrawaddy
Magazine 16th March 2010
[5] The proof of this can be seen in the
monumental statutes in Naypyidaw
[6] Mizzima News 12-2-2012 U.N. should
consider commission of inquiry on Burma:
[7] Mizzima 5 -6 -2012 Fighting
in Kachin State Detailed in Free Burma Ranger’s Report
inntek
lampan mi khat peuhmah kihel lo in, vak thap loh ding nakpi in, hong
gen uhi. Mualtungmi sungah Kokand te hong kihel ahimanin, athei lote in,
Sente sa in, sat lup dingin, zintun ni sun in hong ki kaikhawm man uhi.
Kokand te ahilam atheih uh ciangin, khawl kik uh in, inntekte palo in,
vak khiat loh ding hong gen uhi. Journalist zong tampi hong pai ahimanin
reporter card pua lo te, khuasung lutsak lo uhi. Reporter card suang lo
in, man zaihzaih khat, khuanawl lam ah, manzaih in apai leh khuasung
nungakte in, na mu uh ahimanin naman uhi. A thu aki theihtel ciang khah
kik uhi.
